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Equal access to justice - sometimes
By G. Phillip Shuler
In 1982, Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA) to alleviate the oftentimes-crushing financial impact
upon small employers wrongfully accused by federal agencies
of law violations.
The EAJA authorized such an employer to apply for an award
of attorney's fees and expenses under the Act when it proved
its innocence. The applicant must show that an agency was
not substantially justified in prosecuting the matter. The
burden then shifts to the agency to prove that it had "substantial
justification" to proceed.
The National Labor Relations board adopted implementing
regulations as provided in the EAJA. The act restricts the
right to apply to individuals with a net worth of no more
than $2 million; sole owners of an unincorporated business
with a net worth of not more than $7 million; and any other
entity, public or private, with a net worth not exceeding
$7 million nor 500 employees.
This is consistent with congressional policy that the rights
under the EAJA be restricted to smaller entities most deeply
affected by inappropriate prosecutions. An award for attorney
or agent fees may not exceed $75 per hour, but may include
reasonable expenses of the attorney or agent customarily charged.
Even though customary fees for such services have, over the
last two decades, increased, substantial payments are possible
depending upon the amount of time and effort expended to achieve
the successful result. Although the rules permit the board
to reconsider new maximum rates for attorney fees, if an appropriate
petition be filed, no effort has been made to accomplish this
modification.
An application for the award of fees and expenses may be
directed at improper action by the NLRB General Counsel for
each of the steps in prosecution of the case. It can be in
initiation of formal proceedings by issuance of compliant,
proceeding to trial, in an appeal of an adverse decision by
a judge, or, even after a case is won by the general counsel,
in a back pay or other compliance proceeding.
A decision on an application for such relief is initially
by a judge, usually the one who heard the principal case in
the first place. Either the applicant or the general counsel
may appeal a judge's adverse ruling to the full National Labor
Relations Board. Its decision is generally final.
Most EAJA issues arising in NLRB proceedings involve an investigative
decision by the general counsel, through its regional office,
to issue compliant and go to trial on an unfair labor practice
charge against an employer. After a decision by the judge
that is adverse to the general counsel's case, it must decide
whether it is justified to continue by appealing that decision.
Prior justification for action probably dissolved when the
judge discredited the general counsel's witnesses. But even
if the judge has agreed with general counsel, this is not
necessarily dispositive of a company's ultimate remedy under
the EAJA. If a company successfully reverses the judge's decision
through an appeal, it may yet receive board agreement that
there was never initial justification for the prosecution.
As the above explanation should make fairly clear, the road
to justice under the EAJA is not smoothly paved, and there
are many potholes to be avoided in the pursuit of its partial
remedies. There are obvious impediments to convincing the
NLRB that its constituent part was not "justified to
a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person" or did
not have "reasonable bases both in law and fact."
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). This is not
a result that any agency wishes to reach, EAJA grew out of
Congress's concern that high costs of litigation might deter
small entities from vindicating their rights before a federal
agency. Agencies apparently do not want to discourage their
own prosecuting arms by subjecting them to belittlement for
proceeding unreasonably, especially in retrospect. Thus, justice
may be achieved for the small employer more rarely than generally.
An illustration is in a September 2003 case, Abell Engineering
and Manufacturing Inc., 340 NLRB No. 19. This case involved
the discharge of an employee previously active in an unsuccessful
organizing attempt. Subsequently, he solicited another employee
to resign from this employer and take a job with a union contractor.
The company fired him for this act of disloyalty. The initial
legal issue had been whether or not this solicitation was
protected activity under the National Labor Relations Act.
The judge considered it simply an extension of prior union
organizing activity which is protected and cannot be the basis
for discharge.
The employer insisted, and the board ultimately agreed, that
the man was fired for the one act of disloyalty, especially
because the company had only three employees in the unit.
Thus the activity was unrelated to prior organizing or to
improving employee conditions. After its win, Abell duly filed
an application for relief under the EAJA.
It was denied, first by the judge, and then by the board.
The board held that, even though the compliant was dismissed,
there had been a reasonable justification to proceed in the
case. It pointed out that it had analyzed the case differently
from either the parties or the judge so its ultimate finding
could not have been anticipated.
Even though the general counsel proved to be wrong, it had
not been unreasonable to extend certain doctrine to new factual
scenarios. Thus, the employer had to pay to vindicate its
discharge of a disloyal employee and then paid to lose his
attempt to be reimbursed for some of these unjust expenses.
The company probably enjoys no solace that the board's decision
will not discourage regional offices from future attempts
to extend current doctrine to new factual scenarios.
The above case illustrates a situation where the controlling
issue was interpretation of law. Many NLRB cases involve,
initially, credibility issues. These are resolved in the hearing
before the judge, and probably represent the majority of cases
where inappropriate action is taken by a regional office.
The investigative function that initiates agency action on
a charge does not resolve credibility issues that are uniquely
the purpose of a trail. Although documentary and other objective
evidence may permit an investigative unit to determine the
facts, sometimes it requires deciding who is telling the truth.
In the latter event, general counsel must issue complaint
and proceed to hearing.
If its witnesses be disbelieved, there is no violation. In
these instances, the initial justification for proceeding
has dissolved when a judge will not believe his witnesses.
The responsibility of a "reasonable person" at that
point is to abandon the prosecution. However, if the general
counsel elects to appeal the judge's decision, it risks a
finding that from that point forward there was not substantial
justification to continue proceedings.
The board finds in such cases that, if the witnesses were
believed, there would have been a violation, and no remedy
appropriate under EAJA simply because the witnesses lied.
However, once the judge in the case has removed that justification
the general counsel does not continue "with justification."
An applicant should be successful for its continued attorney
and expense costs from that point forward.
A small company forced to defend itself from an unjust complaint
from the NLRB should, after successful defense, consider the
possibilities of seeking relief from the costs of such litigation.
Careful examination of the underlying facts and law, together
with the interpretations and conclusions by the judge and
board, give a fairly clear understanding by which the probabilities
of success can be measured.
Although overall results seem less than anticipated when
EAJA was passed, there are probably substantial meritorious
claims never filed. Certainly the NLRB does not seek to encourage
them.
Editor's Note: G. Phillip Shuler
is a partner in the New Orleans office of Chaffe, McCall,
Phillips, Toler & Sarpy.
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